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ABSTRACT. The influence of Brentano on the emergence of Husserl's notion of 
intentionality has been usually perceived as the key of understanding the history of 
intentionality, since Brentano was credited with the discovery of intentionality, and 
Husserl was his discipline. This much debated question is to be revisited in the 
present essay by incorporating recent advances in Brentano scholarship and by 
focusing on Husserl's very first work, his habilitation essay (Über den Begriff der 
Zahl), which followed immediately after his study years at Brentano, and also on 
manuscript notes from the same period. It is to be shown that (i) although Brentano 
failed to enact a direct influence on Husserl's notion of intentionality (much in line 
with K. Schuhmann's claim), (ii) yet the core of Brentano's notion remained operative 
in Husserl's theory of relations, which is seemingly influenced by John Stuart Mill 
and Hermann Lotze. This investigation is intended as a contribution towards the proper 
understanding of the complexities of Husserl's early philosophy. 
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The aim of this article is to examine the possible influence of Brentano, 
who was a teacher of Husserl, on the formation of Husserl's notion of intentionality. 
This goal, a seemingly innocent historical undertaking, is burdened with many 
difficulties, most of them resulting from the Rezeptionsgeschichte of this question.  
Intentionality is, for Husserl, an all-encompassing question; and for many 
it seemed that Husserl's notion of intentionality is best to understand from a historical 
point of view. A manifest candidate for these investigations was Franz Clemens 
Brentano, who, at the same time, re-introduced the term “intentionality” into modern 
philosophy and, as a teacher of Husserl, played a key role in turning Husserl's 
attention from mathematics to philosophy1. The presumed influence of Brentano on 
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the formation of Husserl's notion of intentionality therefore quickly became the 
Holy Grail of the researchers. The quest has been abruptly ended, however, by Karl 
Schuhmann, who proved2 that it was rather the various debates of inside Brentano's 
circle of disciplines, especially a book by Kazimierz Twardowski3, the Polish-born 
logician, what exercised a decisive influence on the young Husserl's notion of 
intentionality. This discovery even led to the claim that “Husserl did not get his 
concept of intentionality from Brentano as is generally supposed to be the case, but 
rather developed it in the context of his reflections on Twardowski’s well-known work.”4 
What this essay intends is, as a first characterisation, a more balanced view 
of Brentano's influence on Husserl's early notion of intentionality. In order to achieve this, 
I will first briefly revisit Brentano's account of intentionality to establish, what an 
influence could possibly consist in. To uncover the influence of Brentano on 
Husserl, I will consider the period before the supposed influence of Twardowski. I 
will therefore investigate the  Über den Begriff der Zahl, the only extant part of Husserl's 
Habilitationsschrift in 1887, for signs of influences. The essay will conclude with 
an evaluation of its results from a broader perspective. 
 
I – Revisiting Brentano 
Brentano is usually considered as the one who re-introduced the notion of 
intentionality into the modern philosophy.5 The work and the passage that is most often 
quoted in respect to this discovery, is the beginning of a chapter from the Psychologie 
vom empirischen Standpunkt of 1874: 
Jedes psychische Phänomen ist durch das charakterisiert, was die Scholastiker des 
Mittelalters die intentionale (auch wohl mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes genannt 
haben, und was wir, obwohl mit nicht ganz unzweideutigen Ausdrücken, die Beziehung auf 
einen Inhalt, die Richtung auf ein Objekt (worunter hier nicht eine Realität zu verstehen 
ist), oder die immanente Gegenständlichkeit nennen würden. Jedes enthält etwas als Objekt 
in sich, obwohl nicht jedes in gleicher Weise. In der Vorstellung ist etwas vorgestellt, in 
dem Urteile ist etwas anerkannt oder verworfen, in der Liebe geliebt, in dem Hasse gehaßt, 
in dem Begehren begehrt usw.6 
This passage, no matter how many times it was cited, does not occupy a 
central position in the Psychologie. It is touched in the course of searching for a 
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demarcation criterion between two groups of phenomena, the psychical and physical 
phenomena. Before it, Brentano has already proposed some criteria, but he is unsatisfied 
with them, as they did not provide a positive and uniform characterisation of the 
phenomena in question. Though he seems to be content with the present proposal, 
he will nevertheless continue to establish further criteria (amongst them the spatial 
localisation of physical phenomena). Of course it does not exclude at all that the 
main focus of later interest could be on Brentano's re-introduction of the notion of 
intentionality; and, concerning that, it must be said that both Brentano seems to be 
conscious of that he is doing a re-introduction of a mediaeval philosophical notion 
into contemporary use, thereby justifying the retrospective characterisation of his 
achievement as a rediscovery, and, furthermore, even a cursory glance at the 
coming literature, especially in the circles of phenomenology, suffices to show how 
much impact his rediscovery indeed had. 
The exact content of Brentano's original notion of intentionality is, 
however, less trivial to establish. A first look at the passage cited above would 
suggest that Brentano's account of intentionality consists in the claim that the 
object of the presentation is somehow contained in the presentation itself. A major 
consequence of this claim would be that the object is then devoid of independent 
existence, i.e. its existence is linked to that of the presentation. This rendering of 
Brentano's position is reinforced by the received interpretation of his work. As 
Roderick Chisholm, the main protagonist of Brentano's rediscovery for the 
analytical philosophy in the 1960s put it: 
These passage contains two different theses: one, an ontological thesis about the 
nature of certain objects of thought and of other psychological attitudes; the other a 
psychological thesis implying that reference to an object is what distinguishes the mental or 
psychical from the physical. According to the doctrine of intentional inexistence, the object 
of the thought about a unicorn is a unicorn, but a unicorn with a mode of being (intentional 
inexistence, immanent objectivity, or existence in the understanding) that is short of 
actuality but more than nothingness.7 
What Chisholm calls “psychological thesis” is definitely indubitable: Brentano 
expressis verbis claims that it is the “intentional inexistence” which “characterizes” 
the psychical phenomena. Moreover, in the Psychologie the introduction of the notion 
of intentionality occurs, as I have already mentioned, in the context of a search for 
a criterion of the division between psychical and physical phenomena. He considers  
intentionality to provide a positive characterisation of the psychical phenomena, 
and refers back to it many times. 
Concerning the second thesis of Chisholm, the passage seems to provide 
equal justification. Brentano speaks about “inexistence”, “immanent objectivity”, 
and, in a rarely cited sentence phrase, he adds that “the object is not to be understood 
as something real”. 
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This thesis of the received interpretation, however, has been recently came 
under fierce criticism in the literature on Brentano.8 The main occasion not to content 
ourselves with Chisholm's second, ontological thesis is provided by a retrospective 
remark of Brentano in 1906, responding to a criticism made by one of his former 
disciplines. In order to understand Brentano's response, we must first familiarize 
ourselves with the critique itself. 
The introduction the notion of intentionality seems to succeed in delineating 
the psychical phenomena. The main feature of these phenomena therefore consists 
in their reference to a certain object. However, the above characterisation does not 
succeeded in describing the reference itself. It is undeniable that presentations are 
always presentations of something. But it could be argued that the objects, which 
are intended by the presentations, necessarily possess such properties that are 
incompatible with the ontological thesis outlined by Chisholm. E.g. when I have a 
presentation of an actual apple tree, then the object of my presentation is the apple 
tree itself, existing in the physical world. It is an essential property of this apple 
tree that it exists in the unmodified sense of the word, i.e. without any restrictive 
qualification. Though I can have a presentation of an apple tree whose existence is 
“short of actuality but more than nothingness” (like when I present myself an apple 
tree that does not really exists, e.g. an apple tree that is merely thought of), that 
presentation would differ from the former one. Brentano's account of intentional 
reference thus, it seems, substitutes the object qua intentional object (an object that 
is merely thought of) in place of the object of an intentional relationship.9 
This same critique was presented by Alois Höfler, a former discipline of 
Brentano, on the psychologist's congress in 1905, Italy, in which Brentano himself 
could not participate due to his failing health. When Brentano was informed about 
that by Anton Marty, he protested with strong terms: 
Von dem, was Sie über Höflers Äußerungen sagen, war mir dies über „Inhalt“ und 
„immanentes Objekt“ der Vorstellung befremdlich. [...] Es ist aber nicht meine Meinung 
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gewesen, daß das immanente Objekt = „vorgestelltes Objekt“ sei. Die Vorstellung hat nicht 
„vorgestelltes Ding“, sondern „das Ding“, also z.B. die Vorstellung eines Pferdes  nicht 
„vorgestelltes Pferd“, sondern „Pferd“ zum (immanenten, d.h. allein eigentlich Objekt zu 
nennenden) Objekt. [...] Das „gedachte Pferd“ als Objekt genommen, wäre Gegenstand der 
inneren Wahrnehmung, die das Denkende wahrnimmt, wenn dies mit dem Gedachten ein 
Paar Korrelative bildete, da korrelative ohne einander nicht wahrnehmbar sind. Das, was 
als primäres Objekt empfunden oder vom Verstand universell als primäres Objekt gedacht 
wird, ist aber doch nicht Gegenstand der inneren Wahrnehmung. Entweder müßte ich der 
primären Vorstellungsbeziehung gar kein Objekt und gar kein Inhalt zugeschrieben haben, 
oder ich konnte ihn nicht = „gedachtes Objekt“ gleichgesetzt haben. Ich protestiere also 
gegen die mir angedichtete Albernheit.10 
Brentano claims here quite clear that the critique is mistaken. But what 
does he bring forward in defence of his claim? In the last sentence of the citation, writing 
from the distance of thirty years, Brentano claims that either he has not ascribed any 
object to the presentation, or he has not equated it with the “thought object.” Since 
he has definitely spoken about the object intended by the presentation, it remains the 
claim that he had not equated the object of the presentation with the “object that is 
merely thought of”. This claim is also contained in the second part of the citation. 
Brentano's protest, which was usually ignored as a self-defensive distortion, 
or a lapse of memory, has been recently taken up by some scholars who claim that 
Brentano was in fact right about his former position, i.e. Chisholm's second, 
ontological thesis is mistaken. There are several arguments in favour of this recent 
change in interpretation11, but the one provided by Mauro Antonelli stands out of 
them, since it also provides an explanation of what the “object that is merely thought 
of” could consist in. The argument of Antonelli could be demonstrated even on the 
above retrospective remark of Brentano: “The horse that is merely thought of”, says 
Brentano, “would be an object of the inner perception when it perceives the thinking.” 
But, adds Brentano, the primary object (i.e. the real object intended by the presentation 
itself) “is not perceived by the inner perception.” This somewhat cryptic remark 
becomes clear when we consider that the horse, being a physical object, is 
perceived by the outer perception (which is the perception in the normal sense of 
the word). The “horse that is merely thought of” and the horse as such therefore 
must be different. But it does not mean that the “horse that is merely thought of” 
does not exists or it does not have any significance for the theory of perception. It 
is given in the inner perception when we perceive the thinking (i.e. the perception 
of the horse) itself. Antonelli claims that it is possible to understand Brentano's position 
in the Psychologie along these lines. He calls the “horse that is merely thought of” 
intentional correlate, which might be only a terminological clarification, but it paves 
the way for a concise formulation of his interpretation: intentional correlates are 
different from intentional objects. The former are given by the inner perception, 
which, according to Brentano, accompanies every perception itself; and they are 
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therefore parts of the consciousness in the strict sense of the word. The intentional 
objects, on the other hand, are the objects proper, they are not part of the perception in 
any sense of the word, and, in case of non-existing objects, they do not exist at all. 
Brentano's theory of intentionality, therefore, does not fall a prey to such a 
straightforward objection Höfler (and many others) proposed. 
This short review of the current historical research concerning Brentano's 
introduction of intentionality has, I believe, provided some important lessons for 
the present investigations: The received view of Brentano as the one who has 
rediscovered intentionality for the contemporary philosophy is, despite of every 
divergence in Brentano's own intention, basically justifiable. But there is one 
important addition which is easy to overlook: the real challenge in Brentano's 
conception of intentionality is to provide such an account of the relation between 
the presentation and its object that avoids the devastating consequence of 
Chisholm's second thesis. Brentano, at least according to some recent interpretations, 
did exactly that, and this complexity is to be taken into account when examining 
the possible emergence of Brentano's notion of intentionality in other authors. 
Let us now turn our attention to Husserl. 
 
II – Looking for Traces of Intentionality in the Habilitationsschrift 
As I have already mentioned, the recent consensus puts the decisive period 
in the formation of Husserl's notion of intentionality at 189412, and it is usually 
claimed that Husserl has seldom cared about intentionality as such in the Über den 
Begriff der Zahl or in the Philosophie der Arithmetik13. While it is undeniable true,  
a closer look at these works could uncover that Brentano's concept of intentionality 
has not failed to bear its mark upon the young Husserl. In this section I will attempt 
to identify traces in the Über den Begriff der Zahl, the only extant part of Husserl's 
Habilitationsschift, which could tell about how, and in which extent, Husserl was 
influenced by Brentano's concept of intentionality.  
There are two sporadic locations in the Über den Begriff der Zahl where 
Husserl speaks about questions concerning the intentionality. 
In a footnote annexed to his introductory examples Husserl makes in passim a 
short claim concerning the relation between the presentations and their objects: 
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Es bedarf wohl kaum Erinnerung, daß wo es sich um objektiv-wirkliche Dinge 
handelt, diese doch durch Vorstellungen in unserem Bewußtsein repräsentiert sein müssen. Der 
vorgestellte Inbegriff verhält sich dann zu dem intendierten Inbegriff der wirklichen Dinge, wie 
sich auch die Vorstellung eines einzelnen wirklichen Dinges zu diesem selbst verhält.14 
Husserl also makes a cursory reference to the conceptual apparatus of the 
intentionality in the course of his critical investigations: 
Gewiß ist es richtig, daß es sich bei der Bildung von Zahlen wie auch von 
Vielheiten in concreto nicht um ein passives Aufnehmen oder ein bloß heraushebendes 
Bemerken eines Inhaltes handelt; wenn irgendwo, so liegen hier spontane Tätigkeiten vor, 
die wir an die Inhalte knüpfen. [...] Ein auf die sämtlichen Inhalte gerichtetes einigendes 
Interesse und zugleich mit und in ihm (in jener gegenseitigen Durchdringung, wie sie 
psychischen Akten eigen ist) ein Akt des Bemerkens heben die Inhalte heraus, und das 
intentionale Objekt dieses Aktes ist eben die Vorstellung der Vielheit oder des Inbegriffs 
jener Inhalte. In dieser Weise sind die Inhalte zugleich und zusammen gegenwärtig, sind sie 
eins, und mit Reflexion auf diese Einigung gesonderter Inhalte durch jene psychischen Akte 
entstehen die Allgemeinbegriffe Vielheit und (bestimmte) Zahl.15 
Though both citations appears in the text unconnected with their direct 
context, they can be made to bear on the main argument of the Über den Begriff der 
Zahl, and even on an important issue of the Philosophie der Arithmetik. As it is widely 
known, Robert Sokolowski convincingly argued that Husserl's analysis of the 
collective connection (kollektive Verbindung) is already an example of constitutional 
analysis.16 Although Sokolowski has based his argument on the Philosophie der 
Arithmetik, his results shed a different light on the corresponding parts of the Über 
den Begriff der Zahl, which are now usually investigated as being possible precursors 
of the constitutional analysis in the Philosophie der Arithmetik. This could lend an 
important role to two passages cited. Most recently Carlo Ierna has used  them to 
prove that the constitutional analysis of Husserl already involves higher-order objects.17 
However it is important to distinguish between advances concerning the 
constitutional analysis of the presentation of numbers, and concerning the more 
general notion of intentionality: The Über den Begriff der Zahl is intended by Husserl 
as a study of the particular kind of presentations that lay beneath our concept of the 
number,18 i.e., a study in a particular kind of intentionality, and it is Husserl's advance 
in this field that is usually emphasized. However it is also possible to ask which 
general view on intentionality is manifest in this work; and it would be a petitio 
principi to claim that Husserl's advances concerning the presentation of multitudes 
go hand in hand with his advances concerning a general view of intentionality. Quite 
contrary, it will turn out that Husserl's inventive analysis of the origin of the 
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presentations of numbers co-exist with his less developed and less articulated 
general notion of intentionality. 
In fact, when the two citations are investigated from this point of view, 
they prove to be less conclusive than from the point of view of the aforementioned 
constitutional analysis. First of all, it is uncertain what kind of distinction Husserl 
intends to signal with his use of “intentional object” in the second citation. Is 
“intentional object” the same as the single object of the intentional act, or is it its 
“intended” object (two use the terminology of the first remark), or its “presented” 
object? The distinction between “intended” and “presented” objects itself seems to 
be problematic, at least in its present form. The representational relationship between 
the presented and intended object, displayed in the first citation, will be later 
seriously attacked by Husserl himself, and it is also to remember that Brentano drew a 
different line between phenomena and real words things, namely that he restricted 
the intentional relation to the domain of the phenomena. 
The most serious problem with this two sporadic occurrences is that they 
fail to have any connection with either their intermediate context or with the conceptual 
apparatus of the rest of the work, and the passages themselves do not explicate 
their terms. Any further interpretation of these remarks is bound therefore to make 
unwarranted presuppositions on the meaning of its terms. It is probably the best to 
consider these passages to be what their immediate positions in the text suggests: 
one occasion of a common sense truism, and one incidental reference to a 
conceptual framework which is itself not employed by Husserl.19  
There is, however place in Husserl's work, namely his excursus into the 
theory of relations20, which provides a natural occasion to elaborate on the question 
of the intentionality as such, and Husserl actually takes this opportunity to do so. 
The interpretation of this excursus is, though, less trivial than it seems. 
 
III – Interpreting Husserl's Theory of Relations: Intentionality and 
Encompassing 
At first glance, it would seem that in elaborating his theory of relations, 
Husserl simply relies on James Mill to conceive relations as contents of the 
consciousness, and then involves the Brentanoian distinction between physical and 
psychical phenomena to classify relations, according to the Relationsphänomenon 
itself, into physical relations (content-relations) and psychical relations. The latter class 
of relations thus “intentionaly encompass”21 its fundamenta. Husserl then treats the 
collective connection (kollektive Verbindung) as psychical relation and goes on to 
explore its structure and exact role in the formation of the concept of numbers. 
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main course of argumentation of the Über den Begriff der Zahl, while that is in fact not the case. 
20 Hua XII 328-331 
21 Cf. Hua XII 329.27 




The interpretation of this excursus is, however, a bit more tricky. In order 
to uncover it, I will first consider what is really implied by Husserl's reference to 
Mill's theory of the relations, then I will investigate how it is possible to cast out 
the theory of intentionality in the terms of a theory of relation (as did by Brentano 
himself), and then I will attempt to determine the exact position Husserl seems to take. 
At the beginning at the excursus, Husserl claims that, though there is no 
universally accepted theory of relations, a commentary of John Stuart Mill on his 
edition of a book of fathers suffices us to understand what relations really are. 
Husserl then quotes the text of J. St. Mill in German: 
Objekte, physische oder 
psychische, sind in Relation zueinander 
vermöge eines komplexen 
Bewußtseinszustandes, in den sie beide 
eintreten, auch für den Fall, daß der 
komplexe Zustand in nichts weiter 
bestände als im Denken an beide 
zusammen. Und sie werden aufeinander 
in so vielen verschieden Weisen 
bezogen, oder, mit anderen Worten, sie 
stehen in so vielen distinkten 
Relationen zueinander, als es spezifisch 
verschiedene Bewußtseinszustände gibt, 
von denen beide Teile ausmachen. 
Any objects, whether physical 
or mental,are related, or are in a 
relation, to one another, in virtue of any 
complex state of consciousness into 
which they both enter; even if it be a no 
more complex state of consciousness 
than that of merely thinking of them 
together. And they are related to each 
other in as many different ways, or in 
other words, they stand in as many 
distinct relations to one another, as 
there are specifically distinct states of 
consciousness of which they both form 
parts.22 
Although after this citation Husserl expresses his possible debt to Meinong 
by a reference to his Hume-Studien II, the insistence of Husserl on the lack of any 
accepted theory of relations has bought him the anger of Meinong when he sent 
him a copy of the Philosophie der Arithmetik in 1891.23  However, there is a far 
bigger problem with this reference to Mill, namely that it deceivingly suggests that 
Mill's notion of relation is in accordance with Brentano's classification of 
phenomena, and, more specifically, his theory of intentionality. This deceiving 
suggestion might be further accelerated by the translation's rendering of physical–
mental as physische–psychische. 
Let us take a closer look at the issue. The cited text, as I have already 
mentioned, is in fact from John Stuart Mill, who annexed several commentaries to 
his father's work. This situation would make it hard to establish the exact position 
                                               
22 German text according to Hua XII 328-329, English original according to Mill, 1868, 10. The same 
citation also appears, with slight deviations in punctuation, in a manuscript of Husserl (K I 32 / 3b). 
23 In the corresponding part of the Philosophie der Arithmetik Husserl opted for an English citation and 
omitted his reference to Meinong, which might have contributed to avoid the indignation of the latter 
(expressed in a letter to Husserl at 19 June 1891, see BW I 129). (The Über den begriff der Zahl, though 
printed, never was available in bookshops.) Ierna has also noted that in the Über den Begriff der Zahl 
Husserl has copied the verbatim translation of Mill's text from Meinong (Ierna, 2006, 63) 




implied here, but the remark by J. St. Mill is, fortunately, extensive enough to address 
the general theory of relations it relies on: 
In order to make quite clear the nature of this peculiarity, it will be desirable to advert 
once more to the double mode of signification of concrete general names, viz. that while they 
denote (or are names of) objects, they connote some facts relating to those objects. The fact 
connoted by any name, relative or not, is always of the same nature; it is some bodily or mental 
feeling, or some set of bodily or mental feelings, accompanying or produced by the object. (...) 
The peculiarity in the  case of relative names is, that the fact connoted concerns two objects, and 
cannot be understood without thinking of them both. It is a phenomenon in which two objects 
play a part. (...) Now, when in a series of phenomena of any interest to us two objects are 
implicated, we naturally give names expressive of it to both the objects, and these are relative 
names. The two correlative names. The two correlative names denote two different objects, the 
cause and the effect, or the parent and son; but though what they denote is different, what they 
connote is in a certain sense the same: both name connote the same set of facts (...). This set of 
facts, which is connoted by both the correlative names, was called by the old logicians the 
ground of the relations, fundamentum relationis.24  
The complex state of consciousness, referred to by Husserl, is thus the 
fundamentum relationis, in virtue of which we give relative (correlative) names to 
the corresponding objects (and we name these names as “relation”). The overall 
problem with this conception is that it already implies a theory of reference and 
therefore it is incompatible with the claim that the relationship between the 
presentation and its object is supposed to consist in the “intentional inexistence” of 
the intentional object in the presentation. Let us look at the details of this problem! 
After referring to Mill, Husserl goes on to classify the relations based on 
the complex state of consciousness. Husserl takes the “thinking together”, as 
described by Mill, to mean the encompassing (Umfassen) two or more contents, 
which Husserl calls “fundaments” of the relation. Now it is possible, says Husserl, 
that this encompassing occurs intentionaly or not intentionaly. Apart from a reference 
to the corresponding parts of the Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt and the 
manifest use of Brentano's termini technici, Husserl says comparable little on what 
this difference of encompassing is supposed to consist of: 
Eine jede [sc. eine physische] Relation ruht auf „Fundamenten“; sie ist ein komplexes 
Phänomen, welches in einer gewissen (nicht näher zu beschreibenden) Weise Teilphänomene 
umfaßt; aber keineswegs umfaßt eine jede Relation diese ihre Fundamente intentional, d.h. in 
jener spezifisch bestimmten Weise, in der ein „psychisches Phänomen“ (ein Akt des Bemerkens, 
Wollens etc.) seinen Inhalt (das Bemerkte, Gewollte etc.) umfaßt. Man vergleiche z. B. die Art, 
in welcher die Vorstellung, die wir Ähnlichkeit zweier Inhalte nennen, diese selbst einschließt, 
mit irgendeinem Fall der intentionalen Inexistenz, und man wird anerkennen müssen, daß es 
sich um ganz verschiedene Arten des Einschlusses handelt.  (...)  
Jede dieser Relationen repräsentiert ein eigenartiges „psychisches“ Phänomen (in 
der hier zugrunde liegenden Bedeutung dieses Terminus) und gehört mit Bezug darauf in 
dieselbe Hauptklasse. (...) 
                                               
24 Mill, 1869, vol. II.  pp. 8-9 (I suppose that the 1878-79 edition (see Hua XII 582) is a reprint of the 
1869 edition.) 




Auf der anderen Seite steht eine zweite Hauptklasse von Relationen, welche 
dadurch charakterisiert ist, daß hier das Relationsphänomen ein „psychisches“ ist.25 
Husserl will later complain that he has here confused the relation itself (the 
relational attribute) with the fundaments of the relation, that is, he has confused the 
contents that are encompassed with the phenomenon that results from the 
encompassing.26 While that complaint is undeniable true, the bigger problem is that 
Husserl seems to forget that intentionality is not solely a special mode of encompassing, 
but a mode of encompassing which is introduced in order to account for the 
relationship between the presentation and its objects. It is, of course, possible to 
further investigate the structure of the complex state of consciousness, and the 
“thinking together” of the contents could be, naturally, analysed in terms of the 
special mode of “inexistence” which is peculiar of the intentional acts. This analysis, 
furthermore, will go beyond what Mill intends, and it will further necessitate to 
distinguish between the parts which form the complex and the resulting complex 
(as it is exactly signalised by Husserl's retrospective critical remark). However, when 
Mill explains the origin of the relation via a complex state of the consciousness, he 
already supposes that the components of this complex state gives rise to names 
which denote real objects (and connote the components themselves), in other words, he 
already makes use of a theory which substitutes the theory of intentionality.  
 
IV – On the Possibility of a Relational Account of Intentionality 
Quite interestingly, Brentano's concept of intentionality could be well 
harmonised with a theory of relations which is very close to that of Mill – though 
not in the way Husserl attempted. Even more interestingly, this was presented by 
Brentano himself in the course of his lectures on psychology. At that time Husserl 
was already in Halle, though some signs indicate that he, at least to some degree, 
must have been familiar with Brenteno's conception of intentionality as a relation.27 
                                               
25 Hua XII 329-330 
26 In the Philosophie der Arithmetik he says: „Um nun unseren Sprachgebrauch zu fixieren setzten wir fest, 
daß unter « Relation » jenes komplexe Phänomen, welches die Grundlage für die Bildung der relativen 
Attribute bildet, und daß unter « Fundament der Relation » [...] jeder der bezogenen Inhalte zu verstehen 
ist.“ (Hua XII 67) Even more telling is an another retrospective remark made by Husserl: „Meine 
Unterscheidung in der Philosophie der Ar<ithmetik> zwischen primären Relationen (oder besser 
verknüpfungen, Komplexionen) und psychischen (intentionalen) Relationen scheint Verwandtschaft zu 
haben mit Meinongs Unterscheidung zwischen realen und idealen Relationen (und Komplexionen). 
Zunächst bemerke ich, daß ich in der genannten Jugendschrift das Wort Relation im Sinn Mill's nehme und 
demgemäß mit Komplexion identifiziere. [...] Und diesen Bewußtseinszustand selbst nenne ich dort (wenig 
passend) Relation, und erkläre ausdrücklich, daß er nicht bloß als ein intentionales Erlebnis, als ein Akt zu 
fassen sei, sondern als gleichwertig mit Phänomen überhaupt. Zwei Inhalte sind in Relation, zwei Inhalte 
sind Teil eines Phänomens, sagt also dasselbe.“ (K I 19 / 16a The manuscript itself is not dated. Schuhman 
conjectures (see Husserl-Chronik p. 31) that it might have been written on the occasion of the above 
mentioned correspondence with Meinong in 1891.) 
27 Brentano lectured on descriptive psychology three times between 1887/88 and 1890/91. Husserl was in 
the possession of a (partial) college note from the 1887/88 lecture of Brentano made by Dr. Hans 




Let us see how Brentano himself has explained intentionality in terms of a 
theory of relations in his 1890/91 Psychognosie lectures, just four years after 
Husserl had studied at him. 
1. Vor allem ist es eine Eigenheit, welche für das Bewußtsein allgemein 
charakteristisch ist, daß es immer und überall, d.h. in jedem seiner ablösbaren Teile eine 
gewisse Art von Relation zeigt, welche ein Subjekt zu einem Objekt in Beziehung setzt. 
Man nennt sie auch „intentionale Beziehung“. Zu jedem Bewußtsein gehört wesentlich eine 
Beziehung. 
2. Wie bei jeder Beziehung finden sich daher auch hier zwei Korrelate. Das eine 
Korrelat ist der Bewußtseinsakt, das andere das, worauf er gerichtet ist.  
Sehen und Gesehenes, 
Vorstellen und Vorgestelltes (...) usw. 
Bei diesen Korrelaten zeigt sich, wie schon Aristoteles hervorhob, die 
Eigentümlichkeit, daß das eine allein real, das andere dagegen nichts Reales ist. So wenig 
ein gewesener Mensch, so wenig ist ein gedachter etwas Reales. Der gedachte Mensch hat 
darum auch keine eigentliche Ursache und kann nicht eigentlich eine Wirkung üben, 
sondern indem der Bewußtseinsakt, das Denken des Menschen gewirkt wird, ist der 
gedachte Mensch, sein nichtreales Korrelat, mit da. Trennbar sind die Korrelate nicht  von 
einander, außer <wenn sie> distinktionell <sind>. 
(...) 3. Erläuterungen des Ausdrucks Objekt: etwas innerlich Gegenständliches ist 
gemeint. Draußen braucht ihm nichts zu entsprechen.  Zur Verhütung von Missverständnissen 
mag man es „inwohnendes“ „immanentes“ Objekt nennen.28  
This text, which is usually considered as a manifestation of the received 
view of Brentano's theory of intentionality, can be interpreted along the lines of the 
new conception of his theory of intentionality. This interpretation, which was 
pioneered by Werner Sauer29, is basically a re-investigation of Brentano's underlying 
theory of relations. When we read at Brentano, that “Wie bei jeder Beziehung 
finden sich daher auch hier zwei Korrelate“, it is compelling to take in in the sense 
of the classical, simplest theory of relations, namely that Brentano here speaks 
about the two entities which are related to each other. „Diese Sichtweise auf 
Brentano zu übertragen – says Sauer –, heißt aber, den Aristotelischen Hintergrund 
                                                                                                                       
Schmidkunz (archival signature Q 10). Moreover, there exists some preserved notes taken by 
Husserl, probably from Brentano's 1884/85 WS lecture on Elementary Logics and its Necessary 
Reform, which already present intentionality as a relation: „Die Relationen auf psychischen Gebiet 
[...] I. Die intentionalen Relationen Solcher gibt es 3 Klassen: Vorstellungen, Urteile, Liebe und 
Haß. [...] Von diesen Relationen gilt der Satz, daß ihr einer Terminus real, der andere nicht real ist. 
II. Die Relationen der Gleichheit und Verschiedenheit. Die Verhältnisse der Quasi-Gliechheit. Auf 
diesem Verhältnis der Quasi-Gleichheit beruht der Begriff des Wirklichen. Quasi-Gleichheit besteht 
zwischen dem zeitlich Modifizierten und dem nicht Modifizierten, ferner zwischen dem intentional 
Modifizierten und dem, was nicht modifiziert ist. (Immanentes Objekt – das äußere Objekt, das 
diesem entspricht). Das nicht Modifizierte im Unterschied vom Modifizierten heißt das Wirkliche.“ 
(K I 19 / 3a) 
28 Brentano, 1982, 21-22 
29 See Sauer, 2006 




seines Denkens über relationale Sachverhalte zu ignorieren.“30 According to 
Aristotle, claims Sauer31, there is a categorical difference between the substances 
related to each other (like Simmias and Socrates) and the relational properties 
considered as unary predicates (like “smaller-than”, “greater-then”). A relational state 
of affairs thus consists of two relata, that is, two substances, and two correlata, that 
is, two entities existing only in a modified sense. This makes it easy to interpret the 
case of intentional relation: One of the correlata, as Brentano said, is the act of the 
consciousness. As with every relation, always exists two correlates. The second 
correlatum, which always exists,is an inseparable part of the conscious act: “the 
seen”, “the presented”, „das, worauf er [der Bewußtseinsakt] gerichtet ist“. But it 
is only a correlatum, not the related substance itself! 
Now, it is the correlata which always exists, and the relata could easily be 
non-existing. What are these relata? Let us look very closely what Brentano says in 
the opening paragraph of the citation: „es [das Bewußtsein] immer und überall [...] 
eine gewisse Art von Relation zeigt, welche ein Subjekt zu einem Objekt in 
Beziehung setzt.“ The relata are the subject and the object, the latter of them could 
easily be non-existing (like the centaur). “Es ist nun leicht, das hinter der 
ontologischen Deutung der Intentionalitätsthese beim vorreistischen Brentano 
stehende Mißverständnis herauszustellen: Es ist einfach die Verwechslung der 
Korrelate mit den Relata“ – concludes Sauer.32 
The similarity between this explanation of the intentional relation and the 
theory of relation Husserl is seeking to find in Mill is manifest: the relata are 
related in virtue of contents in the consciousness. It would be therefore eminently 
possible to reconstruct Brentano's relational theory of intentionality in the framework 
of the theory Husserl is pursuing: it is the complex state of consciousness in virtue 
of which an external object stands in relation to the subject. However, Husserl 
takes a totally different path when he tries to consider intentionality as a particular 
way of the togetherness of the contents.  
 
V – Some Refinements in Husserl's Manuscript Notes on Mill and Lotze 
Husserl, it seems, both oversees that Mill's theory of relations already 
implies a particular view on the relationship between contents of the consciousness 
and objects, a question which is supposed to address by intentionality itself, and he 
also missed the opportunity to rely on Brentano's conception of intentionality in the 
                                               
30 Sauer, 2006, 21-22 
31 See Sauer, 2006, 21-23 
32 Sauer, 2006, 23. A further advantage of his interpretation is that it makes clearly visible where the 
difference between Brentano's early (the so-called pre-reistic) and later (the so-called reistic) 
position really lies: In both phases Brentano denied that a relation necessitates the existence of two 
relata. However, in his later phase he thought that the second correlatum, the inseparable part of 
the conscious act is merely a fictional entity resulting from the abuse of language. When doing so, 
Brentano has essentially returned to Aristotle's position, who warned against the supposition of a 
correlatum in the case of the thought-relation. (Cf. Sauer, 2006, 22sqq) 




terms of a very similar theory of relations. The importance of this recognition is, 
methinks, not to identify some kind of  “error” on Husserl's side, but to gain insight 
into how complex, how multi-faceted his early thought was, and to recognize how 
many separate influencing factors are present at the same time. I will return to the 
possible lessons such recognition could provide later. 
I have already highlighted that Husserl conceives intentionality as a special 
way of encompassing contents. Let us further investigate this special role of 
intentionality! In a manuscript note which stems from a convolute written in the 
years around the completing of the Über den Begriff der Zahl, Husserl is clearly 
aware of the disadvantages of John Stuart Mill's constant references to outer 
objects in his psychology: 
Dann geht es Seite 58 Gomp<erz> weiter:33 „Es gibt in alle dem was die das Verhältnis 
bezeichnenden Worte ausdrücken, nichts, was sich nicht in Zustände des Bewussts<eins> 
auflösen ließe; wobei äußere Gegenstände ohne Zweifel durchgängig als die Ursachen 
vorausgesetzt werden, die einige dieser Bewusstseinszustände hervorrufen und Geister als 
die Subjekte, die sie insgesamt erfahren, wobei aber weder die äußeren Gegenstände noch 
die Geister ihr Dasein anders als durch Zustände des Bewusstseins kundgeben.“  
Dieser Hinweis auf äußere Ursachen welche einige jener Bewusstseinszustände 
welche das Fundament im Sinne M<ill>'s bilden, hervorrufen, haben doch bei der 
Beschreibung des allgemeinen Charakters der Relation nichts zu tun. Jedenfalls gehören sie 
nicht zum Begriff der Relation überhaupt. Dieser beständige Hinweis auf äußere Gegenstände 
trübt die Darstellung in der Logik [sc. das Werk von J. St. Mill]. Darum ist eben die Darstellung 
in der Analysis [sc. das Werk von James Mill] besser und wissenschaftlicher, da sie sich direkt 
an die Phänomene hält und darum psychologischer ist.34 
An expression of dislike is, of course, in itself insufficient as a delineation 
against an unwanted consequence of a philosophical position. It is to be asked 
whether Husserl succeeds in constructing a concept of relation which avoids this 
pitfall and which clarifies the position that is assigned to intentionality in his early 
theory of relations.  
An another note in the above-mentioned convolute of manuscripts further 
corroborates that for Husserl the focus was on the being-together of the contents: 
Mill gebraucht den Ausdruck Bewusstseinszustand (state of mind) in demselben 
Umfang wie wir den Ausdruck Phänomen. Es ist also nicht etwa ein geistiger Zustand als 
psychischer Akt derjenige, was hier gemeint ist. Ich betone dies hier, weil in der Tat eine 
Reihe hervorgehender Philosophen die Beziehung als 'psychisches Phänomen' angesehen 
haben. So zum Beispiel Lotze. Nach der Mill'schn Erklärung fällt der Begriff Relation 
zusammen mit dem Begriff des Ganzen in dem weitesten Sinn. Inhalte stehen in Relation 
wenn sie Teile eines Ganzen bilden; welcher Art übrigens dies Ganze sei; <gestr. ohne 
                                               
33 The sentence cited by Husserl appears at p. 58 of Th. Gomperz's “authorised translation” of J. St. 
Mill's Logic (Mill, 1872, vol. I p. 58), in the middle of the chapter on relations (Book I Section III 
Chaper IV, §§ 10-11). Husserl was in possession of this series by Th. Gomperz (archival signature 
BQ 318a). 
34 K I 32 / 6b 




sinnliche> die Beschränkung die Mill macht, das nämlich nur zwei Inhalte gegeben seien, 
ist unnötig, ja hinderlich.35 
Unlike in his retrospective critique, which was cited above, here Husserl is 
keen to classify relations as phenomena. There is though a certain crumbling in his 
terminology: he calls the opposite class “mental state”, “psychical act” or “psychical 
phenomenon”, so it might be helpful to consider what Hermann Lotze, whom Husserl 
mentions as a representing the opposite view, says about relations (Beziehungen): 
„jede Beziehung, indem sie zwei Glieder verbindet, enthält den Gedanken einer 
Stellung jedes dieser Glieder innerhalb dieser Beziehung selbst, und die Stellung 
braucht nicht für beide dieselbe zu sein, sie wird im Gegentheil am häufigsten 
verschieden, das eine Glied das Umfassende, Ganze, Bedingende, das andere das 
Umfaßte sein, der Theil, das Bedingte.“36 
Husserl's opposition to Lotze is curious, since by postulating two positions 
(Stellungen), each for the corresponding relata, Lotze seems to imply a quite 
similar theory of relations. In order to identify what Husserl is combating in Lotze, 
an another location could be helpful (also recorded by Husserl in his manuscript): 
„[solche Beziehungen]...entstehen, wenn unsere ganz willkürliche Aufmerksamkeit 
irgend zwei Elemente oder vielmehr deren Vorstellungen mit einander in eine ihnen 
selbst ganz gleichgültige und unwesentliche Berührung bringt.“37 Although this 
characterisation is offered by Lotze only in respect to a certain class of relations, 
Husserl, not unlike other philosophers in their relationship to their contemporaries, 
perceives only what is very similar to his position, and focuses clearly on the 
remaining difference: though it would be possible to draw a parallel between Mill's 
and Lotze's theory of relation, there is a remarkable difference, namely that Lotze's 
requires the active taking of a position by the consciousness (this seems to be 
intended by his chosen term „Stellung“). 
What Husserl combats in Lotze is therefore his involving of an active 
moment of the consciousness. Against that, Husserl conceives the relation purely as 
some contents being together: “the notion of the relation coincides with the notion 
of the whole, taken in the broadest sense.” 
It is finally to be examined whether this theory of Husserl, considered to be 
as close to the simple being together of contents as it is possible, is capable of 
accounting for the intentionality. First of all, it should be noted that Husserl, as it 
was already highlighted, misses the opportunity, prelineated by Brentano himself, 
to account for intentionality as a relation by considering the contents of the 
                                               
35 K I 32 / 42a 
36 Lotze, 1874, 22. The first part of the sentence, along with a reference to „Logik 22“ is noted by 
Husserl in the above-mentioned convolute (K I 32 / 17b). An edition of this book of Lotze (21880) 
was in Husserl's possession (archival signature: BQ 285). 
37 Lotze, 1883, 18. The whole passage is noted at K I 32 / 17b with the reference „Dict<ate> über 
Met<aphysik> S<eite> 18“. Husserl was in possession of a copy of this edition (archival 
signature: BQ 283) 




consciousness to be the corresponding correlata. Instead, Husserl opts for treating 
intentionality as being merely a mode of encompassing, of incorporation, of 
“inexistence.” Meanwhile, as I have mentioned in the beginning of this section, he 
seems to neglect the conceptual apparatus of intentionality when speaking about 
the relationship between presentations and its real-world object. 
It might seem that the use of intentionality purely as a mode of 
encompassing, though not faithful to the intention of Brentano, is still a conceptual 
possibility. This is however not true. By introducing intentionality as a mode of 
encompassing Husserl posits a difference in the simple being together of the 
contents, originally envisaged by Mill. This difference implies different strata in 
the complex state of consciousness, since, to confine ourselves to Husserl's own 
examples, the willing and the willed definitely belongs to different layers. The use 
of intentionality as a mode of encompassing therefore tends to break up the simple 
structure of the contents of the consciousness and implies a structure that is similar 
to the structure of the act and its object. It is only that Husserl does not treat this 
structure as being responsible for the relationship between the act of the consciousness 
and its object. 
 
VI - Conclusions 
The claim that Brentano's notion of intentionality has influenced Husserl 
is, much in line with Schuhmann's characterisation, false. But, it has turned out, 
both parts of this claim are false, i.e. Brentano's notion of intentionality differs 
from what it is usually supposed to be, and it was not Husserl's thinking about 
intentionality that Brentano notion of intentionality has influenced. Brentano's 
concept of intentionality has not failed to exercise an impetus on Husserl's thought: 
Not only that Husserl makes occasional use of Brentano's technical terms related to 
intentionality, but he also tries to preserve the intentional inexistence as an 
operative concept when constructing his theory of relations. There is however a 
noteworthy difference: Husserl is not inclined to resort to the theory of intentionality 
when thinking about the relationship between the conscious acts and their objects. 
The history of Husserl's notion of intentionality, and of his early philosophy in 
general, it seems, could be even more complicated than we would incline to think. I 
interpret these results as a call to a more differentiated account of the development 
of Husserl's early philosophy, and of his notion of intentionality in particular. The 
question might be asked why it is important to be aware of the heterogeneity of the 
sources and the complexity of the formation of Husserl's notion of intentionality. 
The importance of this recognition, methinks, stems from the fact that the development 
of Husserl's notion of intentionality is not only a piece of conceptual history, but a 
clue to the evaluation of his early work.  
The early work of Husserl has seen many evaluations, sometimes quite 
rejective, focusing on the question whether Husserl's position  is to be characterised 




as realistic38, metaphysically neutral39 or idealistic.40 Among the many factors such 
evaluations should consider, one is Husserl notion of intentionality (or, in other 
words, his position about the relationship between the conscious acts and their 
objects). I believe that an investigation that incorporates the complexities hidden in 
this notion could show that many evaluative conclusions are, to a certain degree, 
premature, because they disregard the heterogeneity of the traits in Husserl's 
thinking about the problems of intentionality and the transient nature of the (often 
aporetic) reconciliations he tries to achieve. Such an investigation might also prove 
that all of these uncertainties and difficulties, are,  much in accordance with 
Husserl's own characterisation, arrived at a satisfactory solution only after his 
breakthrough to transcendental phenomenology in 1906. 
It is this longer investigation the present article has hopefully contributed to. 
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